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INSIGHT
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Reagan Doctrine's Darkest Days

SUMMARY: The Reagan Doctrine — the pledge to aid democratic forces throughout the Third World — is beset by enemies from the Politburo to the Pentagon. The Iran-Contra affair has been an especially damaging blow. But it is competing factions within the government, combined with an increasing congressional role in making foreign policy, that has left the doctrine impotent. The president's penchant for compromise has allowed the bureaucratic warfare to continue, dealing a potentially deadly blow to his policy.

Soviet special operations forces attack Afghan rebel camps at the Pakistani border, killing hundreds of Afghans who are resisting the Soviet occupation of their country. Nicaraguan troops cross into Honduras chasing anti-Sandinista rebels and clash with Honduran soldiers, prompting the United States to fly 200 Honduran troops to the border area in U.S. helicopters. Fidel Castro increases the number of Cuban troops in Angola, propping up a brutal Marxist regime against a well-advanced insurgency. In a radical policy shift, Castro vows to keep his troops in Angola until "apartheid is dismantled in South Africa."

If this reads like a nightmare scenario dreamed up by a low-intensity warfare expert operating in the bowels of the Pentagon, read again. Each of these virtually unnoticed events occurred in the weeks following the public revelations of the Iran-Contra affair in November. And it is no accident that each of these Soviet-backed offensives is a challenge to the Reagan Doctrine and specifically to President Reagan's pledge to aid anticommunist "freedom fighters" throughout the Third World.

As the U.S. government is engulfed in one of the deepest foreign policy crises in recent history, opponents of the Reagan Doctrine in the Soviet Politburo, in Congress and in the administration itself, who have been chipping away at the premier

pillar of Reagan foreign policy since its genesis, are moving with renewed intensity to kill it. They are taking advantage of prevailing confusion, inertia and infighting in the highest foreign policy councils of the government.

The critical findings of the presidential commission examining the role of the National Security Council have made a desperate situation worse. The commission, named after its chairman, former Sen. John G. Tower of Texas, concluded that contrary to President Reagan's denials, the United States did seek to trade arms for American hostages in its overtures to Iran. It also found evidence that some proceeds from the arms sales went to the rebels fighting the Marxist-Leninist Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. In both covert initiatives, Lt. Col. Oliver L. North, an NSC deputy, exceeded what higher-ranking White House officials had intended and approved, in the opinion of the commission.

In piecing the puzzle together, the commission relied heavily on internal NSC memos, which indicated that North had set up a subterranean foreign policy apparatus that operated outside normal government channels. The legal questions raised by these activities have been referred to independent counsel Lawrence E. Walsh, who is investigating charges of criminal wrongdoing. Two congressional committees also are conducting inquiries.

More important than specific findings of wrongdoing is the fact that this scandal, unlike Watergate, has cast a pall on U.S. foreign policy. The Tower commission's report is likely to cause bureaucratic gridlock. Says Neil Livingstone, president of the Institute on Terrorism and Subnational Conflict, "How would you like to be on the NSC and have to approach [adviser Frank C.] Carlucci with an imaginative idea?"

Or Howard Baker, for that matter. The new White House chief of staff is going to be so busy cleaning up after the departure



Muskie and Tower (right): Critical report further damaged the doctrine.



The Oval Office: Some say the doctrine's weakness stems from the president's failure to settle policy disputes himself.

of Donald T. Regan that new initiatives will be the furthest thing from his mind. The Reagan Doctrine has already lost Director of Central Intelligence William J. Casey, who resigned in January for health reasons.

The commission has also fueled a much larger political conflict, as President Reagan's opponents seek to gain control of the foreign policy agenda from the administration and to divulge wholesale U.S. intelligence secrets related to both the CIA and the NSC.

The Iran-Contra affair strikes particularly hard at the heart of the Reagan Doctrine, a bold and imaginative policy that includes support for the democratic center in countries under authoritarian or totalitarian rule. It was the sense of deep frustration among high-ranking Reagan Doctrine supporters in the administration at their inability to push the foreign policy bureaucracy and Congress to embrace the doctrine that led to the course of events detailed by the Tower commission.

"The opponents of the Reagan Doctrine, who pushed the administration to adopt these unorthodox approaches in the first place, are now getting their wish," says a Pentagon expert on guerrilla insurgency. "At least we were implementing the Reagan Doctrine for a time. Now, no one is."

Two themes run through the history of

the Reagan Doctrine. One is a tale of bureaucratic warfare that has wounded the doctrine from the outset. The most recent example: the internecine battle between the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency over the political and military strategy of the Nicaraguan rebels.

"There has never been one predominant strategic thinker in this administration who could settle the competing agendas of the various bureaucracies," says Zbigniew Brzezinski, national security adviser in the Carter administration. Ultimately, of course, it was Reagan's duty to fill that vacuum, by replacing aides who did not share his views and settling high-level stalemates himself. That he was unwilling or unable to do either has now threatened the foreign policy doctrine that bears his name.

The other theme is what Lawrence S. Eagleburger, a former under secretary of state in the Reagan administration, calls "Congress's penchant for making foreign policy by committee." Ever since Congress passed the War Powers Act in 1973, making explicit its role in the commitment of U.S. troops to combat, it has been encroaching on the authority of the president to conduct foreign policy. Congress has scotched arms sales, proposed arms control negotiating positions, tied strings to foreign

aid and circumscribed covert intelligence actions, all as an expression of a desire to be informed and consulted. Says Eagleburger: "Congress has made it more and more difficult to conduct foreign policy in anything but a defensive way."

While it has yet to be established conclusively that money from U.S. arms sales to Iran was funneled to the Nicaraguan rebels, it is clear that the president at least tacitly approved of efforts by some members of his staff to implement the Reagan Doctrine secretly, particularly the effort to keep the rebels alive after Congress cut off official U.S. aid in 1984.

It all started with a June 1982 speech Reagan gave to the British Parliament, the first in a long line of official statements setting forth the ideals embodied in the Reagan Doctrine. (Two years earlier, candidate Reagan's imagination had been ignited by tales of the success of Jonas Savimbi, anticommunist rebel leader in Angola.) In that speech, Reagan spoke of cultivating "the fragile flower of democracy" to foster "democratic ideals in authoritarian regimes."

U.S. actions in implementing that doctrine ran the gamut, from the outright invasion of Grenada to liberate the Caribbean island from communism to behind-the-scenes diplomatic maneuvering in sup-

ROBERT LLEWELYN: UNPHOTO



The generally popular invasion of Grenada was a Reagan Doctrine success.

port of the democratic center in El Salvador. Those policies were successful and won bipartisan praise.

But the policy in Nicaragua was a sticking point. By late 1982 the White House had grown increasingly unhappy with the State Department's low level of enthusiasm for its Central America policy, particularly with State's efforts to negotiate the Nicaraguan rebels out of existence. According to former administration officials involved in the effort, the White House believed that some Reagan Doctrine initiatives had to be run covertly then in order to circumvent opposition from others in the administration — in this case, primarily Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Thomas O. Enders — and in Congress.

Responsibility for coordinating the covert initiatives fell to the National Security Council staff. In January 1983, the president signed a national security decision directive — a classified executive order — that permitted the council to coordinate inter-agency "political action strategies," the purpose of which was to counter moves by "the Soviet Union or Soviet surrogates." The directive gave the Reagan Doctrine teeth for the first time.

One of these covert actions, carried out by the CIA but conceived by former national security adviser Robert C. McFarlane, was the mining of Nicaragua's harbors in 1984. When the action was revealed, demonstrating that the U.S. covert role in Nicaragua was larger than previously believed, an outcry erupted on Capitol Hill. Six months later, Congress voted to cut off further aid to the rebels.

By the time Congress had acted, North was coordinating a wide range of covert activities from the White House, including

the raising of money from wealthy individuals and foreign governments for the Nicaraguan rebels. North set up a host of offshore companies and secret bank accounts that kept the Contra movement alive with money and equipment. Evidence also points to payments to the anticommunist rebel forces in Angola and Afghanistan.

The resulting public revelations of North's activities have not so much undone the Reagan Doctrine as unmasked its precariousness. For the most telling fact about the Reagan Doctrine is that unlike other presidential doctrines — the Truman Doctrine or the Nixon Doctrine — no Reagan administration official has actually pronounced U.S. support for democratic revolution to be a "doctrine." Thus, the level of commitment and clarity such a doctrine would entail was never forthcoming from the administration.

"I remember going to the White House and pointing out on a map what was happening, that these democratic forces were rising up," says Jack Wheeler, the executive director of the Freedom Research Foundation. "Since then, the idea of backing democratic liberation was adopted rhetorically, but there were no policy directives to back up the rhetoric."

It took Charles Krauthammer, writing in Time magazine in 1985, to explain coherently what Reagan said he had been trying to achieve and to give it a name. A year later, after the regimes of Ferdinand E. Marcos in the Philippines and Jean-Claude Duvalier in Haiti fell with a shove from the U.S. government, policy analysts, journalists and some U.S. officials began touting what they called "the other side of the Reagan Doctrine" — support for democracy everywhere, including challenging friendly dictators.

It was in fact this half of the Reagan Doctrine — pressure on friendly but despotic rulers in Haiti and the Philippines, and support for democratic institution-

building in the new democracies of Latin America — that had raised hopes and elicited bipartisan kudos at this time last year. But now, some of that luster has worn off. The administration and Congress have failed to follow up and help these countries solve the intractable problems they face.

In the Philippines, President Corazon Aquino faces the same communist threat and the economic mess that Marcos left behind when he fled the nation in February 1986 on the advice of the Reagan administration. She also has confronted, and confounded, several coup attempts by Marcos loyalists. After first voting it down, Congress approved \$200 million in additional aid to the Philippines last fall, but Aquino said it was not nearly enough.

Haiti has not fared much better since the United States helped engineer the ouster of Duvalier. Unemployment remains at 60 percent and per capita annual income at \$300. "Expectations were too high last February," says Leslie Delatour, Haiti's finance minister. "We are making progress in restructuring our economy and bringing in capitalism, but resources are a problem. We need more U.S. aid."

Inadequate foreign aid is a stumbling block. All of the Latin American democracies (many of which are still green) have been hit hard by congressional cuts in the foreign aid budget, which dropped to \$13.3 billion for fiscal 1987 from \$15.4 billion in 1986. Since certain countries specially earmarked by Congress got no cut in aid (primarily Israel and Egypt), the Latin American nations bore the brunt of the cuts. In addition, neither Congress nor the administration has managed to find the funds to supply the \$300 million in economic aid approved last August for El Salvador, Costa



Solarz, not Reagan, pushed for aid to the guerrillas in Kampuchea.

Rica, Guatemala and Honduras.

Congress finally got around to sending the Philippines some money, but it took a passionate speech by Aquino to turn the tide. That hesitation on the part of Congress was another sign that the Reagan Doctrine had failed to catch fire, even with such a popular policy as the one in the Philippines.

In addition, the administration took so many stutter steps on the way to its policy in relation to Aquino that many wonder it worked out at all. "If you look at the case of the Philippines, we acted correctly, but it was in response to events," says one former National Security Council aide. "It was no grand design. It was sort of an accident."

All of which suggests that intellectuals and analysts outside the administration were attempting to supply the administration with a strategic vision it had not adopted and, perhaps, did not even share. Brzezinski dismisses the Reagan foreign policy as "ad hoc-ism."

Resistance within the executive branch of the government to the Reagan Doctrine does not fit the traditional analysis of the competing foreign policy baronies: State Department doves, Pentagon hawks and CIA rogue elephants. According to a number of current and former administration officials, there were essentially two competing factions with adherents in each of the agencies.

The first group — most of the State Department, the military officers in the Defense Department and some key CIA officials — believed that negotiations should play the primary role in resolving the anticommunist insurrections in Afghanistan, Angola and Nicaragua. These regional arrangements would allow the communist governments to stay in power but would render them less threatening to their neighbors and to U.S. interests by eliminating their reliance on the Soviet bloc and by loosely committing them to undertake democratic reforms.

The second group — key members of the National Security Council staff, ranking Defense Department civilians, CIA chief Casey and his close aides — generally favored a policy of liberation, with an emphasis on military pressure to force the replacement of the communist regimes with democratic ones.

This second group believed that the communist regimes, if not squeezed militarily, would merely use the negotiation time to consolidate and then export their tyranny. When Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Elliott Abrams



A CIA official was blamed for keeping effective arms from the Afghan guerrillas.

took charge of Central America policy in the spring of 1985, his views on Nicaragua put him more in line with the second group, but other State Department officials remained unconvinced. On Afghanistan and Angola, the State Department stuck with the first group.

The result? "All we did was nickel and dime the resistance forces, giving some level of commitment, but not enough," says one NSC aide. "There really was no policy." This U.S. indecision fostered fear of embracing the freedom fighters on the part of such allies as Pakistan and the Central American democracies, further damaging the credibility of U.S. policy.

The responsibility for resolving these policy disputes rested with the president, says one longtime Reagan aide, but "the president's impulse was to compromise. Actually, he is not the ideologue his detractors have tried to create. But in policy-making, the desire to compromise sometimes means never taking decisive action."

The high point of the Reagan Doctrine probably came in July 1985, in a series of key votes in the House. First, Democrats ended up voting for humanitarian aid to the Nicaraguan rebel forces after a nine-month cutoff. Two days later, the House approved

a military aid package to the noncommunist forces fighting the Vietnamese occupiers of Kampuchea. The next day, it overturned the Clark Amendment, a 1976 prohibition on U.S. aid to the Angolan insurgents. And before the month was out, a symbolic payment of \$5 million in overt humanitarian aid for the rebels in Afghanistan was approved.

But a closer look at these votes shows that the impetus for aiding several of the rebel groups came not from the administration but from Congress. The aid to the Kampuchean rebels was pushed by Rep. Stephen J. Solarz, a New York Democrat, and was opposed by the State Department.

In the case of Angola, the State Department actively opposed scuttling the Clark Amendment. Secretary of State George P. Shultz sent a letter to House Minority Leader Robert H. Michel asking him to oppose the legislation because it would open the way for aid to Savimbi's UNITA rebels, contrary to the State Department's negotiating stance.

The Angolan case illustrates perfectly the two-track policy followed by an indecisive administration. The State Department's Africa bureau continues to pursue negotiation between Angola's communist

government and South Africa. State's objective in the Angolan negotiations is to get South Africa to turn over Namibia to the communist South-West Africa People's Organization and cut off all support for Savimbi, in exchange for which the Angolan regime is supposed to expel 35,000 Cuban troops and Soviet bloc personnel.

As a compromise, after a personal pledge from Reagan to Savimbi during a White House meeting in January 1986, U.S. officials agreed to give about \$15 million in military aid to UNITA last year. The administration will provide about \$15 million again this year, as against a \$1-

about 6,000 Afghan rebels who are battling approximately 120,000 Soviet troops. Each year, according to congressional committee sources, supporters of the rebels in Congress have doubled the administration's aid request, yet effective U.S.-made weapons, particularly Stinger missiles, were not supplied to the rebels until after the resignation last March of CIA Deputy Director John N. McMahon, who adamantly opposed the program.

"It took seven years to get what we needed," says Henry Kriegle, director of the Committee for a Free Afghanistan in Washington. "McMahon was able to block

back talks being held in Geneva among the Soviets, the Soviet-backed regime in Kabul and Pakistan but excluding the resistance forces. The aim of the talks is to exchange a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan for Pakistan's refusal to serve as a conduit for aid to the Afghan rebels.

As in Angola, and possibly Nicaragua, the State Department would have the United States cut off the freedom fighters when an accord is reached. Shultz, sources say, is ready to accept any regime in Kabul, so long as the Soviets pull out. But others in the administration, notably the Pentagon's Fred C. Ikle, under secretary for policy, have declared that a communist-front government in Afghanistan is unacceptable to the United States.

"All along," says Kriegle, "U.S. commitment to negotiations and interest in Soviet feelers about a withdrawal have raised concerns about sacrificing the resistance to a compromise."

The battle of the Nicaraguan rebels has attracted by far the most attention in the debate over the Reagan Doctrine, and it too has been a victim of both bureaucratic resistance and congressional recalcitrance. The main problem, in the view of many observers, has been the administration's seemingly endless revision of its aims in Nicaragua.

The Reagan Nicaragua policy had early setbacks at the hands of both internal and external opponents. In 1982, the reasons for U.S. support of the Contras had not been enunciated clearly by U.S. officials. Opponents of the program convinced the administration that aid could be obtained from Congress only if it would not be used in an effort to change the government of Nicaragua. Thus the administration's strategy was defined quite narrowly: interdicting the flow of arms from Nicaragua to El Salvador's guerrilla insurgents.

Since the policy goal was constricted, the CIA determined that the Contras did not need the heavy weapons, antiaircraft and logistics essential to mount a winning military struggle against the Sandinistas, a Contra goal that went far beyond halting arms to El Salvador.

By 1984, the State Department was again sending mixed signals about Nicaragua policy. U.S. officials were putting pressure on Honduras and Costa Rica to sign a draft treaty that would have cut off support for the Contras in exchange for a commitment by the Sandinistas to discuss reducing their sources of foreign support and better treatment of the opposition. Langhorne A. Motley, the assistant secretary for Latin



CLAUDE LORICA/STEWART

While aid to the Contras is debated, Sandinista troops train near Honduras.

billion annual investment by the Soviet bloc in the Luanda government. "The \$15 million was enough to make a dent but not enough to make a policy. You still have State's policy of negotiation," says one Pentagon critic of the compromise.

Even so, Savimbi's rebels, recently armed with U.S. Stinger antiaircraft missiles, are beginning to make some gains. They are believed to control one-third of the country. UNITA has shot down more than 40 Angolan aircraft in the past few months, convincing the Luanda regime that military victory against it is improbable.

The Afghan program has incurred a similar fate. The United States has provided covert military aid in amounts that have increased annually from \$75 million in 1983 to \$500 million last year to help

it while he was there." Administration sources say more Stingers will be provided this year, but Kriegle thinks it will likely be "too little, too late. Only three of the seven rebel groups have them, and the Soviets have begun mounting a major offensive after the failure of the [January] cease-fire."

On the political front, the Afghan resistance has had even less luck in Washington. Eighteen months ago, the tribal groups made an alliance to try to establish a government in exile. Last June, the groups' leaders came to Washington seeking diplomatic recognition, which might give them a role in negotiations over Afghanistan's future. Several Pentagon officials favored the move, as did many senators.

But the rebels were turned down because the State Department continues to



A January pro-Marcos rally in Manila is indicative of the problems Aquino has faced. But U.S. help has been slow coming.

American affairs, was forced out in the spring of 1985 for backing this proposal and was replaced by Elliott Abrams.

Under Abrams, most administration officials closed ranks behind the Contras' political and military effort. But there have been occasional miscues. Last May, presidential envoy Philip C. Habib sent a letter to congressional Democrats which many conservatives interpreted as signaling his support for a weak peace treaty that would have ended U.S. aid to the rebels. At the time, Rep. Jack Kemp, a New York Republican, urged the president to fire Habib for his "misplaced faith in the omnipotence of diplomacy that would have us walk away from the democratic resistance for false promises of an unenforceable treaty."

Currently, both the United States and Nicaragua have warmed to a proposal advanced by President Oscar Arias Sanchez of Costa Rica. The plan would require all Central American countries to guarantee "full observance of civil rights" and "real pluralistic and democratic processes." It also would require free elections overseen by foreign teams. Abrams and other U.S. officials are not prepared to halt aid to the rebels, however, until the terms of any peace plans are enacted by the Sandinistas, not merely agreed to.

More serious disagreement has broken out within the administration over political and military strategy in Nicaragua. The three main Contra leaders, Arturo Jose

Cruz, Alfonso Robelo Callejas and Adolfo Calero Portocarrera, have been bickering and jockeying for position within the rebel organization for weeks. Cruz, a professorial former Sandinista who is popular on Capitol Hill, had threatened to resign from the United Nicaraguan Opposition, the Contras' political directorate, if Calero did not quit the organization.

Calero is the president of the Nicaraguan Democratic Front, or FDN, whose 15,000 troops are the bulk of the rebels' strength. Cruz, backed by the State Department, believed Calero was cutting the directorate out of important decisions.

Calero resigned Feb. 16 but retained the presidency of the FDN. His position is supported by the CIA managers of the covert Contra program and some members of the National Security Council staff, according to a council aide. They believe that Calero and his military commander, Enrique Bermudez, long affiliated with the CIA, have the ability to direct some Contra military successes against the Sandinistas in the coming months and that Cruz and Robelo are lackluster figureheads installed by State for the benefit of Congress.

These officials believe that "UNO is finished," according to the aide, and that a broadened political and military directorate

will be formed soon. They would like to see Calero return as a member of the new group, and Cruz and Robelo dropped.

But State Department officials say that without Cruz and Robelo, they have little hope of persuading Congress to approve the administration's \$105 million request for the Contras in the fall. They admit that Cruz and Robelo do not have much of a following among rank and file Contras, but they charge that Calero does not either. Further, officials say that neither Calero nor Bermudez has operational control over the Contras in the field. "They don't matter. Cruz and Robelo do," says one State Department official. The real fighting power is held by the regional field commanders.

The outcome of this struggle will likely affect Contra aid prospects. So too will performance in the field. The rebels reportedly are introducing hundreds of better-equipped troops into Nicaragua each week and are meeting little resistance from the Sandinista army. The aid flow has enabled the rebels to regain the initiative.

But some rebel leaders complain that the CIA is dispatching military equipment too slowly and has refused to give them much heavy or sophisticated equipment. "And some of the equipment we have gotten is not working properly," says Calero.

Administration officials say their hesitancy in resupplying the rebels is the result of the complex funding cycle set up by Congress. The system has dispatched aid



Aid for the Angolan guerrillas was opposed by the State Department.

in three waves: \$40 million when the law was enacted last August, \$20 million in October and \$40 million this month. Until this month, the legislation specified the aid could be used only for defensive purposes — training, intelligence gathering and defensive equipment.

Indeed, it has been congressional opposition that has proved most damaging to the rebel program. The rebels are now engaged in an effort to regain the position they lost two years ago, when Congress cut off aid, Calero says. But the revelations that during that time North and other U.S. officials helped money continue to flow is not likely to sit well on Capitol Hill.

Last month, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, now controlled by Democrats, voted along party lines to halt U.S. funds that were approved by Congress last summer but had not yet been given to the rebels. Supporters of the bill admit that even if it passes both chambers, it will not sustain a presidential veto. Still, the vote was seen as an important dress rehearsal for the battle over the administration's upcoming request.

The vote on the new aid, probably in September, will likely be close. Many Reagan Doctrine supporters hope that the Democrat-controlled Congress will continue to fund the rebels, at least through the presidential election in 1988, "if only to avoid blame for losing Nicaragua," says foreign policy analyst Joshua Muravchik.

But others are seeking a more affirma-

tive strategy from the administration. Gen. Paul Gorman, former commander of the U.S. Southern Command, and other U.S. officials, have suggested that the Defense Department be given primary operational responsibility for the Contra program. The Pentagon has resisted such a move. Some Pentagon officials are privately advocating a U.S. naval-air blockade designed to halt the flow of Soviet weaponry into Nicaragua.

One former NSC aide says the administration should begin thinking about how to achieve its Reagan Doctrine goal — the establishment of a democratic government — without the rebels, who are beset with organizational chaos and face a bleak future in Congress. A U.S. invasion, if it came while the Contras were still in the field, would require less than a week and fewer than 30,000 U.S. troops, some experts say.

Conservatives in Congress also are pressing the administration to revitalize the Reagan Doctrine by supporting the Mozambique National Resistance Movement, which is generally deemed the most successful anticommunist insurgency in the world. The 10-year-old popular uprising, which now reportedly controls 85 percent of Mozambique, has as its goal the establishment of democracy in a country suffering since 1975 under a Soviet-backed Marxist regime. The Soviet Union has spent more than a billion dollars to keep its client afloat, and troops from Cuba and

Ethiopia have helped hold off the rebels.

But the United States has repeatedly spurned the rebel group. And not only that, last year the United States gave the Mozambique regime \$70 million in aid.

Conservatives charge that the Reagan Doctrine has gone haywire in Africa. Kemp's strategy for rebuilding the doctrine is to fire Shultz. He recently called for Shultz's resignation for "violating the Reagan Doctrine" by "rolling out the red carpet" for Oliver Tambo, the leader of the radical, nondemocratic African National Congress in South Africa.

At the conservative Heritage Foundation in Washington, foreign policy analyst James T. Hackett has drawn up a list of other actions that Reagan could take without the consent of Congress to shore up his foreign policy and go on the offensive. The list includes such measures as breaking diplomatic relations with Nicaragua, Angola and Afghanistan, and recognizing the freedom fighters as governments in exile.

Whether or not the administration is up to the challenge of moving more decisively on the Reagan Doctrine, the doctrine is likely to live on, at least through the presidential race in 1988. At a recent Conservative Political Action Conference in Washington, the elusive Reagan Doctrine was voted the No. 1 priority issue in the 1988 campaign — which means that Republicans everywhere will be paying it serious lip service as the party marches toward the bloody battle of 1988.

— David Brock



Shultz's meeting with Tambo provoked a call for the secretary's resignation.